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STOPPING CHECKS
CARL ZOLLMIAN*
A CHECK under the negotiable instrument law is not an assign-
ment of a portion of the drawer's funds' except under very extra-
ordinary circumstances2 but is merely the executory order of the de-
positor3 which accordingly may be countermanded 4 or revoked5 or
arrested6 or "stopped"7 on the ground of the fraud8 or on any other
* Professor, Marquette Law School.
'Wall v. Franklin Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392. "The
doctrine that payment cannot be stopped against a holder in due course is
only true in those jurisdictions which hold that a check works an assign-
ment of the funds." Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 951, (Cal. App.).
This assignment theory before the negotiable instrument act was the doc-
trine in a small number of states. First Nat. Bank v. Keith, 56 N.E. 179,
183 Ill. 475, affirming 84 Ill. App. 103; Gage Hotel Co. v. Union Nat. Bank,
49 N.E. 420, 171 Ill. 531, 39 L.R.A. 479, 63 Am. St. Rep. 270, affirming 69
Ill. App. 681; Rogers Park Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 233 Ill. App. 99, 101;
Loan & Savings Bank v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 54 S.E. 364, 367, 368,
74 S.C. 210, 114 Am. St. Rep. 991; Raesser v. National Exch. Bank, 88
N.W. 618, 112 Wis. 591, 598, 56 L.R.A. 174, 88 Am. St. Rep. 979; but sec-
tion 189 of the negotiable instruments act now adopted in all the states
has effectively wiped this doctrine and its consequences out of the law.
The check is primarily an authority and protects the bank when it acts
under it. When the check has been stopped the authority is gone and the
bank must rely on the assignment worked by the check. Raesser v. Na-
tional Exch. Bank, 88 N.W. 618, 112 Wis. 591, 56 L.R.A. 174, 88 Am. St.
Rep. 979.
2In order to place a check beyond the control of the drawer and preclude
him from stopping payment thereon, it must be clearly shown that it was
the intention of the parties to assign all or a part of the specific fund on
deposit. Pease & Dwyer Co. v. State Nat. Bank, 88 S.W. 172, 173, 114
Tenn. 693.
3 People's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey 40 So. 346, 146 Ala. 688; Glennan
v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 102 N.E. 537, 209 N.Y. 12, 52
L.R.A. (N.S.) 302, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 441, affirming 136 N.Y.S. 747, 152
App. Div. 316; Schneider v. Irving Bank, 30 How. Prac. 190, 192, 1 Daly
500; American Defense Soc. v. Sherman Nat. Bank of New York, 162
N.Y.S. 1081, 176 App. Div. 250, affirmed 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695; Hall v.
First Nat. Bank, 252 S.W. 828, 831, remanded for new trial 254 S.W. 522.
4 Ozborn v. Corn Exch. Bank of Chicago, 208 Ill. App. 155; Tremont Trust
Co. v. Burack 126 N.E. 782, 235 Mass. 398, 401; Albers v. Commercial
Bank 85 Mo. 173, 176, 55 Am. Rep. 355; Hunt v. Security State Bank,
179 P248 (Or.). While relation between bank and depositor is-that of
creditor and debtor, bank is subject to orders of depositor in relation to
payment of his check, whether or not payee is a holder in due course.
Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 949. (Cal. App.). A person having
funds deposited in a bank drew a check in favor of different persons
thereon to a much larger amount than his deposit, and afterwards, on the
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ground or for no reason whatsoever 9 and such action by the de-
positor will terminate the power of the bank to pay it thereafter.10
That the drawer by stopping payment may become liable to the holder
is a different matter since the check as to such holder becomes a
note."' This however is no concern of the bank. The drawer by
same day, in banking hours, forbade the bank to pay the checks, and some
time afterwards drew out the whole of such fund for the purpose of dis-
tributing it ratably among all the check holders. Held, that the owner of
a check, who demanded payment of the bank after it was forbidden to pay,
and before the fund was drawn out, was not entitled to claim the amount
of the bank.-Dykers v. Leather Manufacturers' Bank, 11 Paige, 612, 616
(N.Y.). Since a check is not an assignment of any part of the drawer's
account and does not impose a liability on the drawee until accepted or
certified, it can be countermanded at any time before payment or accept-"
ance by the drawer. Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 210 P.499
(Wash.).
5 Weiand's Adm'r v. State Nat. Bank, 65 S.W. 617, 112 Ky. 310, 23 Ky. Law
Rep. 1517, 56 L.R.A. 178; dissenting opinion, 66 S.W. 26, 23 Ky. Law Rep.
1517, 112 Ky. 310, 56 L.R.A. 178; Tramell v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 11 Ky.
Law Rep. 900; Guild v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 121 A. 13; Schneider
v. Irving Bank 1 Daly 500 (N.Y.); Citizens' Bank of Gans v. Mabray, 215
P. 1067 (Oki.) ; Huffman v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Cross Plains, 10 S.W.
(2d) 753 (Tex.). Drawer of ordinary check can revoke it at any time be-
fore bank has paid it or committed itself to pay it, and bank is bound
by notice of revocation, orally or in writing, and liable to drawer to the
amount thereafter paid on the check. Bank of Hamilton v. Williams, 90
S.E. 718; 146 (Ga.). Checks are inland bills of exchange subject to all
the rules applicable to instruments of that character, and impose no obli-
gation upon the drawees, until accepted, and, until presented and paid, are
revocable by the drawer who has the legal control of the money to his
credit until actual acceptance or payment of the checks. First Nat. Bank
v. School Dist. No. 4, Bryan County, 120 P. 614, 31 Okl. 139, 39 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 655. Under Negotiable Instrument Law, sec. 189, providing that
a check is not an assignment of any part of the drawer's funds, and the
bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies the
check, the drawer of an ordinary check may, before it is accepted, revoke
it and forbid its payment, and any subsequent payment by the bank is made
at its peril. Pease & Dwyer Co. v. State Nat. Bank, 88 S.W. 172, 114
Tenn. 693.
6 Murchison Nat. Bank v. Dunn Oil Mills Co., S.E. 885, 886, 150 N.C. 718.
7Hiroshima v. Bank 248 P. 947, (Cal. App.). "The consideration for an ex-
press agreement or for the implied obligation not to pay a holder of a
check after payment of it has been stopped, is found in and springs from
the mercantile relation of the parties and the reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions which the law attaches to that relation." Tremont Trust Co. v.
Burack 126 N.E. 782, 235 Mass. 398, 401. Purchaser who gave broker check
for initial payment on land before a binding contract for the sale of the
land was entered into with vendor, and who thereafter and before a con-
tract was entered into decided that he did not want the land, had a right to
stop payment of check. Thompson v. Killiheffer, 125 A. 11, reversing 119
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drawing the check does not make the drawee an arbiter to decide
any question involving the liability of the drawer toward the payee.3
2
The right which an ordinary depositor has to stop payment on his
checks equally applies where the depositor is a bank and the instru-
ment stopped is a draft.'
3
Any act of the drawer which conveys to the drawee bank before
payment or certification definite instruction to stop payment on a
check is sufficient. 1' No prescribed language is required. A state-
ment: "I shall feel greatly obligated if you will kindly hold up pay-
A. 770, 98 N.J. Law 359. A bank is bound to respect a notice to stop
the payment oif a check and for a failure to observe the direction it is
clearly liable. The check being a mere order on the bank is subject to
revocation by the drawer at any time before it is paid and a bank which
after such notice pays the check pays out of its own funds and cannot
charge the drawer with the resulting loss. Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank
55 N.Y.S. 576, 578, 25 Misc. Rep. 716.
8 Bluefield Nat. Bank v. Picklesimer, 135 S.E. 257 (W. Va.).
9 People v. Orris 121 P. 163, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 170 (Colo.).
1o K.'s father drew a check to K.'s order, and K. delivered it unindorsed
to the stock exchange as a margin. On the same day, and before it was
presented to the bank, K. notified the bank not to pay it. Nevertheless,
the bank officers certified the check. Held, that a decree was proper that
the check was void, and that the bank must place its amount to K.'s
credit. Public Grain & Stock Exch. v. Kune, 20 Ill. App. (20 Bradw.) 137.
" Hiroshima v. Bank 248 P. 947, Cal. App.
12 Wall v. Franklin Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392. Where
a bank had received written notice not to pay checks, and subsequently
refused the cancellation of the order stopping payment because not signed
by certain of drawer's officers as required by corporate resolution, and
such cancellation was not again presented to the bank, subsequent payment
of the checks was unwarranted, and the bank could not justify such pay-
ment by showing that the recipient was justly entitled to it. American
Defense Soc. v. Sherman Nat. Bank of New York, 122 N.E. 695, 225 N.Y.
506, affirming judgment 162 N.Y.S. 1081, reargument of which was denied
165 N.Y.S. 1075. In action against bank for paying check on which payment
was stopped, whether there was consideration between drawer of check and
payee, held immaterial. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 949,
(Cal. App.).
'a Wagle v. Farmers' State Bank, 280 S.A. 62 (Mo. App.).
14 Sarantopoulos v. Mid City Trust & Savings Bank, 222 Ill. App. 24, 28.
A letter advising a bank that the drawer is compelled to suspend is not
equivalent to a direction not to pay checks already given. State Say.
Ass'n v. Boatmen's Say. Bank 11 Mo. App. 292, 297. Writ of error dis-
missed 114 U.S. 265, 29 L.Ed. 174, 5 S. Ct. 878. Resolution of corpora-
.tion, authorizing bank to pay checks signed by named officer, does not
as matter of law revoke authority to pay previously executed checks signed
by former officer. K. & K. Silk Trimming Co. v. Garfield Nat. Bank of
City of New York, 215 N.Y.S. 269, 272, 127 Misc. Rep. 27.
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ment of my check" (describing it) is all that is required.' 5 An order
to "suspend" payment is sufficient.'6 The direction may be given by
telegram x7 or in writing 8 or by telephone 5 or other verbal means20
and may even be communicated to the cashier at his residence on
Sunday" or in the middle of the night" so as to bind the bank.
Since thousands of checks pass daily through the various banks a
proper description of the check which it is desired to stop obviously
is important. A stop order which correctly states only the number
of the check 3 or which materially misspells the name of the payee 4
15 Thompson v. Republic Trust Co. 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 183, 187.
16 Ozborn v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, 208 Ill. App. 155.
17 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louissell, 66 So. 839, 11 Ala. App. 563,
appeal denied; 67 So. 1019, 191 Ala. 665. Reade v. Royal Bank of Ireland
(1922) 2 L.R. 22, 153 L.T. 155; 56 Ir.L.T. 128; 26 Law Notes 37. Since
a promise to pay may be made by telegram an order not to pay may bel
made by the same means. Ozborn v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank of Chi-
cago, 208 Ill. App. 155, 158.
1s A letter written entirely in typewriting, including the signature, is sufficient
as a notice to a bank to stop payment of a check. Sarantopoulos v. Mid
City Trust & Savings Bank, 222 Ill. App. 24.
19 Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank 252 S.E. 161, (Tex.).
20 People's Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey 40 So. 346, 146 Ala. 688. Notice
to stop payment of check may be verbal, and hence written notice there-
after is merely additional indentification of the check. Hiroshima v. Bank
of Italy, 248 P. 957, 951, (Cal. App.).
21 Where a depositor notified the cashier of the bank by telephone on Sun-
day not to pay a check, and the cashier promised to it, whereby the de-
positor took no further steps to protect his money, but the check was paid
before the cashier arrived at the bank on Monday, the bank was liable for
the money so paid, notwithstanding it was a custom of the bank to open
before the usual banking hours, since the cashier, knowing of such custom,
should have been at the bank when its doors were unlocked. Hewitt v.
First Nat. Bank, 252 S.W. 161, 163, 164, (Tex. Com. App.).
22 Kellogg v. Citizens' Bank of Ava, 162 S.W. 643, 176 Mo. App. 288.
2 A stop order correctly giving only the number of the check and mistating
the amount ($196.76 for $196.95) the date (December 21st for December
23) and the payee (Helfand and Abel for bearer) does not describe the
check sufficiently to render the bank liable for paying it. Mitchell v. Se-
curity Bank, 147 N.Y.S. 470, 85 Misc. Rep. 360.
24 A telegram to a bank ordering it not to pay a check drawn to James J.
Manison in and of itself furnishes the bank no authority to decline pay-
ment of a check drawn to James J. Manson though the amount is $250
in both the check and the telegram. The bank is actually under duty to
pay the check to Manson. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louissell, 66
So. 829, 11 Ala. App. 563, appeal denied 67 So. 1019, 191 Ala. 665. Stop
payment order, stating payee's name to be "Harold Orkand," is sufficient
to describe check payable to "H. Orkand." It describes the check with
reasonable certainty. Levine v. Bank of U.S. 229 N.Y.S. 108, 109, 132
Misc. Rep. 130.
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is clearly insufficient in the absence of evidence that the bank has
not been misled thereby.2 5
Though an officer of the bank has no right to accept deposits
for the bank outside of its banking rooms where it has its books and
vaults, he may where he receives a stop order on a Sunday over the
telephone agree to attend to the matter and thereby bind the bank.26
He may do the same in regard to a check obtained by the payee in
a gambling transaction and placed in his hands by such payee at
I A. M. and stopped by the drawer at dawn.2 7
Payment of a check by the drawee after notice by the drawer not
to pay is no defense to the drawee in an action by the drawer to
recover the amount of the check so paid.28  The payment to the
holder is wrongful so far as the drawer is concerned.2 9 The bank
being the agent of the drawer must obey his instructions and is
liable to him for its failure to perform this duty.30 It pays at its
25 In action by depositor against bank for payment of check after notice
not to pay check No. 114 whereas the check was numbered 115, evidence
that on presentation of check for certification employe of bank had re-
fused to do so because payment had been stopped was admissible. Friesner
v. Atlantic Nat. Bank of City of New York, 164 N.Y.S. 136. It seems
that where a banks knows that a telegram directing it not to pay a check
for $250 drawn to James J. M[anison in fact refers to James J. Manson it
is under the duty not to pay the check to James J. Manson. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Louissell, 66 So. 839, 842, 11 Ala, App. 563, appeal
denied 67 So. 1019.
26 Under such circumstances the cashier is not required to do any labor on
Sunday. Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank, 252 S.W. 161, (Tex. Com. App.).
27 The drawer had lost $180 in a poker game and at 1 A. 'M. gave his check.
Swifter than an arrow from a tartar's bow the payee took the check to
the cashier at his home who took it in hand. Aurora had but newly
chased the night and purpled over the sky with blushing light when the
drawer disturbed the cashier and notified him not to honor the check.
Kellogg v. Citizens' Bank of Ava, 162 S.W. 643, 644, 176 Mo. App. 288.
28 People's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey, 40 So. 346, 146 Ala. 688. Schneider
v. Irving Bank, 30 How. Prac. 190, 1 Daly, 500. Hunt v. Security State
Bank, 179 P. 248 (Or) Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank, 252 S.W. 161. Where
a bank received written order not to pay checks, and later refused a
cancellation of this order because not signed by certain officers of the
drawer, payment thereafter was unwarranted. The latter cancelling the
stop payment order was signed by only one officer. The bank sent it back
for proper signature. The drawer was justified in believing that the original
order would be obeyed. American Defense Soc. v. Sherman Nat. Bank of
New York, 162 N.Y.S. 1081, 1082, 176 App. Div. 250, affirmed 225 N.Y.
506, 122 N.E. 695.
29 Huffman v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Cross Plains, 10 S.W. (2d) 753.
30 Wall v. Franklin Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392. The
payment is a mere voluntary act by the drawee bank. The check by the
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peril when payment has been stopped.3' Of course the mere fact
that the stop order has been received by some officer or employee
of the bank does not necessarily make it available to the paying
teller to whom the check may be presented at that very instance or
shortly after. A bank which has 7000 depositors, 17 bookkeepers,
275 employees and handles from 40,000 to 50,000 checks daily must
be given some little time in which to bring home notice to the teller. 2
The act of the drawee bank in charging a check to the drawer
and giving the holder credit for it amounts to payment 33 and pre-
vents the drawer from stopping it thereafter.34 A bank certainly is
entitled to charge a customer's account where it has paid a check
before the receipt of the stop order,3 5 except of course in the case
of a post dated check which the banks pays in advance of its date
and which is stopped before such date. 36 It is no objection that the
payment is made out of banking hours.3 7 The mere act of stamping
stop order is converted into mere evidence of a past transaction. Huffman
v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Cross Plains, 10 S.W. (2d) 753, 755, (Tex.
Civ. App.).
31 In the absence of an express contract limiting its implied obligation to
the drawer of a check, the drawee banks pays at its peril when payment
of the check has been stopped. Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 126 N.E.
782, 235 Mass. 398, 401.
32 Where a telegram countermanding the payment of a check is received by
the bank at 11 minutes before 3, and the check is certified by the bank
between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning; the telegram was
received in ample time to stop payment before the check was presented for
certification. Ozborn v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, 208 Ill.
App. 155.
33. Albers v. Commercial Bank, 85 Mo. 173, 55 Am. Rep. 325. Where bank
agreed, that when cattle shipper deposited sight drafts drawn on con-
signees of cattle, it would pay checks issued by shipper to pay for cattle,
payment of checks given by shipper to pay for cattle cannot be stopped
by him, where bank gave him credit for such drafts and had received
money on them. Moravek v. First Nat. Bank, 237 P. 921, 923, 119 Kan. 84.
34 First Nat. Bank v. Mammoth Blue Gem Coal Co., 240 S.W. 78, 194 Ky. 580.
35 Miller v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank of City of New York, 214 N.Y.S.
76, 126 Misc. Rep. 559. Brandt v. Public Bank, 123 N.Y.S. 807, 139 App.
Div. 173. Where a stop order is made the only question may be whether
the plaintiff notified the bank to refuse payment before payment was
actually made. Spruill v. Bank of Plymouth, 79 S.E. 262, 263, 163 N.C. 43.
36 Stag Co. v. Union Bank of Chicago, 201 Ill. App. 510.
3- The presentation of checks by the liquidating officer of an insolvent bank
to the drawee bank, and their payment at 8:30 in the morning on the day
after the bank closed before the usual banking hour, is not on its face
sufficient to legally rob the transaction of good faith or to make the pay-
ing bank subject to countermand instructions received after it opened,
since there is not, in the absence of statute, any hard and fast rule as
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such a check paid and placing it upon a spindle however is not
enough to constitute payment or to prevent the drawer from stopping
payment.38
A drawer who stops payment by notice on the drawee bank has
done his full duty and owes no further obligation. It is his privilege
to transfer his account to another bank in order to prevent the in-
advertent payment of the check notwithstanding the stop order. Such
act of caution does not impose on him the duty to forsee that the
holder will undertake to change the name of the drawee, and the
further duty to stop payment also at the bank to which he has trans-
ferred his account.
39
It is the bounden duty of a bank when notified to stop the pay-
ment of a check to use all reasonable efforts to comply with the di-
rections and this duty cannot by a provision in the written stop
order be turned into an act of mere courtesy. Compliance with one's
duty while possibly it is courteously performed is just doing what
one is obligated to do.40 A release inserted into the form of a stop
order which the bank induces the depositor to sign or which is print-
ed in his pass book and which attempts to release the bank from
all forms of negligence is ineffective4 - because it is against public
policy 42 and because there is no consideration for it.43 The contract,
to when banks may transact their ordinary busineis and particularly where
it is shown to be customary for business between banks to be handled
thus outside of the usual banking hours. Raynor v. Scandinavian-American
Bank, 210 P. 499, 502, (Wash.).
38 Hunt v. Security State Bank, 179 P. 248.
39 Morris v. Beaumont Nat. Bank, 83 S.W. 36, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 97. The
holder changed the name of the drawee bank from First National Bank
to Beaumont National Bank.
40 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 952, (Cal. App.). Grisinger v. Golden
State Bank of Long Beach, 268 P. 425, 426.
41 Hiroshima v. Bank, 248 P. 947, 251 Cal. App.
42 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, (Cal. App.). Levine v. Bank
of U.S., 229 N.Y.S. 108, 132 Misc. Rep. 130. Stipulation or agreement
between a bank and its customer who stops payment of a check releasing
the bank from the results of mere inattention, carelessness, oversight, or
mistake of its employes, whereby the check is nevertheless paid, is not
against public policy. Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 126 N.E. 782, _235
Mass. 398, 402. Where the drawer, supposing a check had been lost, signs
a stop order payment releasing the bank from liability "in the event of
payment of the said check by error should any check drawn by me be
returned insufficient," and subsequently issues payee a second and larger
check, including the amount of the first, and the payee cashes both, the
maker is bound by his release, and cannot recover because the bank re-
turned a third and subsequent check of the payee because of insufficient
funds. Cohen v. State Bank of Philadelphia, 69 Pa. Super. Ct. 40, 42.
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if it is one, being in derogation of the common law and for the
benefit of the bank will be strictly construed. Courts are averse
to construing an instrument so as to support a waiver of negligence,44
particularly against an illiterate depositor who is informed that he
must sign the check in order to stop payment.45 Therefore a de-
positor who has given an unqualified stop order does not by subse-
quently signing the form prepared by the bank waive his rights
under the first order.46 The fact that he reduces the verbal notice
to writing does not confine him to the writing or merge the verbal
notice into the written one.
4
1
In an action by the drawer against the drawee for paying a check
on which payment had been stopped allegations showing that the
money is on deposit,48 that the check was issued, that notice was
given to stop its payment, that it was nevertheless paid and that
the money was demanded from the drawee which demand was de-
clined states a cause of action without alleging damages. The amount
of damages necessarily appears from the allegations. 4
43 Hiroshima v. Bank, 248 P. '947, (Cal. App.).
44 A bank, honoring a check through oversight, after it had been ordered
by the depositor to stop payment, is liable to him for the amount, though
he had agreed in the pass book that it should not be responsible for a
failure to execute such orders, where it had agreed to endeavor to execute
them, as its agreement rendered it liable for negligence, notwithstanding
his agreement. Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 55 N.Y.S. 576, 25 Misc. Rep.
716.
45 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 951. Fact that bank's customer
did not read what was printed on front and back of card he signed when
stopping payment of a check cannot affect rights and obligations of self
and bank; he being assumed, in absence of fraud, to have assented to all pro-
visions of contract. Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack 126 N.E. 872, 235 Mass.
398, 401.
46 Sarantopoulos v. Mid-City Trust & Savings Bank, 222 Ill. App. 24.
47 People's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lacey, 40 So. 346, 347, 146 Ala. 688.
Where a verbal stop order is given a writing subsequently executed at the
request of the bank is merely by way of additional identification of the
check involved. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 952, (Cal. App.).
48 A complaint which alleges that the assignor of the plaintiff drew a post-
dated check on defendant bank, on which he stopped payment before the
time for payment arrived, but which defendant paid, fails to state a cause
of action where it is not alleged that the drawer of the check was a
depositor, or that defendant held any funds of the drawer, or that the
check was paid out of any such funds. Lippner v. Century Bank of City
of New York, 125 N.Y.S. 1097, 141 App. Div. 254.
19 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 248 P. 947, 949.
